Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of Bayesian confirmation-theoretic enthymemes, and a brief analysis of some recent attempts to resolve the problem of measure sensitivity.
1 (R) c(H, E | K)      > 0
if Pr(H | E & K) > Pr(H | K), < 0 if Pr(H | E & K) < Pr(H | K), = 0 if Pr(H | E & K) = Pr(H | K).
I will restrict my attention to the following four relevance measures of degree of confirmation: the difference measure d, the log-ratio measure r, the loglikelihood ratio measure l, and Carnap's (1962, §67) relevance measure r. The three measures d, r, and l are representative of the varieties of quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory that are currently being defended in the philosophical literature. 2 Carnap's measure r (which is a very close relative of the difference measure d) is included here to illustrate that even relevance measures which are very closely related to each other can diverge in important and subtle ways. The measures d, r, l, and r are defined as follows.
A General Overview of the Problem
Many arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory presuppose that the degree to which E incrementally confirms H, given K should be measured using some relevance measure (or, class of relevance measures) c, where c is taken to have certain quantitative properties. We say that an argument A of this kind is sensitive to choice of measure if A's validity varies, depending on which of the four relevance measures d, r, l, or r is used in A. If A is valid regardless of which of the four relevance measures d, r, l, or r is used in A, then A is said to be insensitive to choice of measure (or, simply, robust ).
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Below, I will show that seven well-known arguments surrounding contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory are sensitive to choice of measure. I will argue that this exposes a weakness in the theoretical foundation of Bayesian confirmation theory which must be shored-up. I call this problem the problem of measure sensitivity. After presenting a survey of measure sensitive arguments, I will examine some recent attempts to resolve the measure sensitivity problem. I will argue that, while some progress has been made toward this end, we still do not have an adequate or a complete resolution of the measure sensitivity problem. Specifically, I will show that the many defenders of the difference measure have failed to provide compelling reasons to prefer d over the two alternative measures l and r. Thus, a pervasive problem of measure sensitivity still remains for many modern advocates and practitioners of Bayesian confirmation theory.
Contemporary Examples of the Problem
It is known (although, apparently, not that widely) that no pair of the four measures d, r, l, and r is ordinally equivalent. That is, each of these four measures can impose distinct orderings over sets of hypotheses and collections of evidence.
6 I have not seen many discussions concerning the measure sensitivity of concrete arguments surrounding Bayesian confirmation theory.
7 In this section, I will show that a wide variety of well-known arguments surrounding Bayesian confirmation theory are sensitive to choice of measure. Gillies (1986) reconstructs the infamous argument of Popper and Miller (1983) for the "impossibility of inductive probability" in such a way that it trades essentially on the following additivity property of the difference measure d:
Gillies's Rendition of the Popper-Miller Argument
5 One can invent more or less stringent varieties of measure sensitivity. For instance, one could call an argument "measure sensitive" (in a very strict sense) if A is valid with respect to some conceivable relevance measure c 1 , but invalid with respect to some other conceivable relevance measure c 2 . Of course, such a strict notion of sensitivity would probably not be very interesting, since highly gerrymandered relevance measures can undoubtedly be concocted to suit arbitrary purposes. I am employing a much more restrictive notion of measure sensitivity which works only with measures that have actually been used and defended in the literature.
6 Rosenkrantz (1981, Exercise 3.6 ) discusses the ordinal non-equivalence of d, r, and l; and Carnap (1962, §67) 
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The details of Gillies's Popper-Miller argument are not important here. All that matters for my present purposes is that the additivity property depicted in (1) is required for Gillies's rendition of the Popper-Miller argument against Bayesianism to go through. Redhead (1985) points out that not all Bayesian relevance measures have this requisite additivity property. Specifically, Redhead (1985) notes that the logratio measure r does not satisfy (1). It follows that the Popper-Miller argument is sensitive to choice of measure. Gillies (1986) responds to Redhead's point by showing that the log-ratio measure r is not an adequate Bayesian relevance measure of confirmation. Gillies argues that the ratio measure r is inferior to the difference measure d because r fails to cope properly with cases of deductive evidence (see § 3.1 for more on this telling argument against r). Unfortunately, however, Gillies fails to recognize that Redhead's criticism of the Popper-Miller argument can be significantly strengthened via the following theorem (see the Appendix for proofs of all Theorems): Theorem 1. l does not have the additivity property expressed in (1).
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Moreover, as we will see below in § 3.1, the log-likelihood ratio measure l is immune to Gillies's criticism of r. So, pending some good reason to prefer d over l, Gillies's reconstruction of the Popper-Miller argument does not seem to pose a serious threat to Bayesian confirmation theory (charitably reconstructed). Rosenkrantz (1994) offers a Bayesian resolution of "the problem of irrelevant conjunction" (a.k.a. "the tacking problem") which trades on the following property of the difference measure d:
Rosenkrantz and Earman on "Irrelevant Conjunction"
I won't bother to get into the details of Rosenkrantz's argument. It suffices, for my present purposes, to note that it depends sensitively on property (2). As a result, Rosenkrantz's argument does not go through if one uses r or l, instead of d, to measure degree of confirmation. The proof of the following theorem demonstrates this strong measure sensitivity of Rosenkrantz's approach: Theorem 2. Neither r nor l has the property expressed in (2).
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Consequently, Rosenkrantz's account of "irrelevant conjunction" is adequate only if the difference measure d is to be preferred over the two alternative relevance measures r and l. Like Gillies, Rosenkrantz (1981, Exercise 3.6 ) does provide good reason to prefer d over r (see § 3.1). However, he explicitly admits that he knows of "no compelling considerations that adjudicate between" the difference measure d and the log-likelihood ratio measure l. This leaves Rosenkrantz in a rather uncomfortable position. As I will discuss below, Rosenkrantz is not alone in this respect. I know of no arguments (much less, compelling ones) that have been proposed to demonstrate that d should be preferred over l. Earman (1992) offers a similar approach to "irrelevant conjunction" which is less sensitive to choice of measure. Earman's approach relies only on the following logically weaker fact about d:
Both the log-likelihood ratio measure l and Carnap's relevance measure r satisfy (2 ) (proofs omitted); but, the log-ratio measure r does not satisfy (2 ) (see § 3.1). So, while still sensitive to choice of measure, Earman's "irrelevant conjunction" argument is less sensitive to choice of measure than Rosenkrantz's. Eells (1982) offers a resolution of the Grue Paradox which trades on the following property of the difference measure d (where
Eells on the Grue Paradox
β = df Pr(H 1 & E | K) − Pr(H 2 & E | K), and δ = df Pr(H 1 &Ē | K) − Pr(H 2 &Ē | K)).
If β > δ and Pr(E
As usual, I will skip over the details of Eells's proposed resolution of Goodman's "new riddle of induction." What is important for our purposes is that (3) is not a property of either the log-likelihood ratio measure l or the log-ratio measure r, as is illustrated by the proof of the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Neither r nor l has the property expressed in (3).
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As a result, Eells's resolution of the Grue Paradox (which is endorsed by Sober (1994) ) only works if one assumes that the difference measure d is to be preferred over the log-likelihood ratio measure l and the log-ratio measure r. Eells (pers. comm.) has described a possible reason to prefer d over r (this argument against r is discussed in § 3.2). As far as I know, Eells has offered no argument aimed at showing that d is to be preferred over l.
Horwich et al. on Ravens and the Variety of Evidence
A great many contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists (including Horwich (1982) ) have offered quantitative resolutions of the Ravens paradox and/or the problem of varied (or diverse) evidence which trade on the following relationship between conditional probabilities and relevance measures of confirmation.
As it turns out (fortuitously), all three of the most popular contemporary relevance measures d, r, and l share property (4) (proofs omitted). But, Carnap's relevance measure r does not satisfy (4), as the proof of Theorem 4 shows.
Theorem 4. r does not have the property expressed in (4).
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Until we are given some compelling reason to prefer d, r, and l to Carnap's r (and, to any other relevance measures which violate (4)-see fn. 11 and Appendix §D for further discussion), we should be wary about accepting the popular quantitative resolutions of the Ravens Paradox, or the recent Bayesian accounts of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity.
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An Important Theme in Our Examples
As our examples illustrate, several recent Bayesian confirmation theorists have presupposed the superiority of the difference measure d over one or more of the three alternative relevance measures r, l, and r. Moreover, we have seen that many well-known arguments in Bayesian confirmation theory depend sensitively on this assumption of d's superiority. To be sure, there are other arguments that fit this mold.
13 While there are some arguments in favor of d as opposed to r, there seem to be no arguments in the literature which favor d over the alternatives l and r. Moreover, as I will show in the next section, only one of the two popular arguments in favor of d as opposed to r is compelling. In contrast, several general arguments in favor of r, l, and r have appeared in the literature.
14 It is precisely this kind of general argument that is needed to undergird the use of one particular relevance measure rather than any other.
In the next section, I will examine two recent arguments in favor of the difference measure d as opposed to the log-ratio measure r. While one of these arguments seems to definitively adjudicate between d and r (in favor of d), I will that this inequality is sufficient to establish that a black raven incrementally confirms that all ravens are black more strongly than a non-black non-raven does. As Theorem 4 shows, this is true for only some relevance measures. This same presupposition is also made by Bayesians who argue that (ceteris paribus) more varied sets of evidence (E 1 ) confirm hypotheses (H) more strongly than less varied sets of evidence (E 2 ) do. See Earman 1992, 69-79 for a survey of recent Bayesian resolutions of the Ravens Paradox, and Wayne 1995 for a survey of recent Bayesian resolutions of the problem of evidential diversity. As far as I know, all of these popular contemporary approaches are measure sensitive in the sense described here.
11 There are other relevance measures which violate (4). Mortimer (1988, §11.1) shows that the measure Pr(E | H & K) − Pr(E | K) violates (4). It also turns out that Nozick's (1981, 252) 
12 See Fitelson 1996 and Wayne 1995 for independent reasons to be wary of Horwich's (1982) account of the confirmational significance of evidential diversity.
13 Kaplan (1996) offers several criticisms of Bayesian confirmation theory which presuppose the adequacy of the difference measure d. He then suggests (76, fn. 73) that all of his criticisms will also go through for all other relevance measures that have been proposed in the literature. But, one of his criticisms (84, fn. 86) does not apply to measure r. 14 Milne (1996) argues that r is "the one true measure of confirmation." Good (1984) , Heckerman (1988) , and Schum (1994) all give general arguments in favor of l. And, Carnap (1962, §67) gives a general argument in favor of r. In Fitelson (1998b) , I discuss each of these arguments in some depth, and I provide my own argument for the log-likelihood ratio l.
argue
3 Two Arguments Against r 3.1 The "Deductive Insensitivity" Argument Against r Rosenkrantz (1981) and Gillies (1986) point out the following fact about r:
Informally, (5) says that, in the case of deductive evidence, r(H, E | K) does not depend on the logical strength of H. Gillies (1986) uses (5) as an argument against r, and in favor of the difference measure d. Rosenkrantz (1981) uses (5) as an argument against r, but he cautiously notes that neither d nor l satisfies (5). It is easy to show that r doesn't have property (5) I agree with Gillies and Rosenkrantz that this argument provides a rather compelling reason to abandon r in favor of either d or l or r.
15 But, it says nothing about which of d, l, or r should be adopted. So, this argument does not suffice to shore-up all of the measure sensitive arguments we have seen. Hence, it does not constitute a complete resolution of the problem of measure sensitivity.
The "Unintuitive Confirmation" Argument Against r
Several recent authors, including Sober (1994) and Schum (1994) , have criticized r on the grounds that r sanctions "unintuitive" quantitative judgments about degree of confirmation in various (hypothetical) numerical examples.
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For instance, Sober (1994) asks us to consider a hypothetical case involving a single collection of evidence E, and two hypotheses H 1 and H 2 (where, K is taken to be tautologous, and is thus suppressed) such that: 15 There are lots of compelling reasons to reject r. For instance, note that, according to r, the degree to which E confirms H need not be the same as the degree to which E dis confirmsH.
That is, there are cases in which r(H, E | K) = −r(H, E | K).
This sort of asymmetry is highly unintuitive, and is not shared by any of the other relevance measures under consideration.
16 Sober (1994) borrows this line of criticism from Ellery Eells. Eells (pers. comm.) has voiced numerical examples of various kinds to illustrate the "unintuitive" consequences of r. I have chosen the present example because I think it is representative of the kind of examples these authors seem to have in mind.
Pr(H 1 ) = 0.09
In such a case, we have the following pair of probabilistic facts:
It is then argued, by proponents of d, that ( †) exposes a highly "unintuitive" feature of r, since this is case in which-"intuitively"-E confirms H 1 to a greater degree than E confirms H 2 . But, according to r, E confirms both H 1 and H 2 to exactly the same degree. Therefore, this example is purported to rule out r (but not d, since d gets the "intuitively correct" answer here).
I am not too worried about ( †), for two reasons. First, ( †) can be only a reason to favor the difference measure over the ratio measure (or vice versa 17 ); it has little or no bearing on the relative adequacy of either l or r. It is clear from the definitions of the measures that Carnap's r is bound to agree with d's "intuitive" answer in such cases. Hence, r is immune from the "unintuitive confirmation" criticism. Moreover, the log-likelihood ratio measure l certainly could agree with the "intuitively" correct judgments in such cases (depending on how the details needed to fix the likelihoods get filled-in). Indeed, Schum (1994, Ch. 5) argues nicely that the log-likelihood ratio measure l is largely immune to the kinds of "scaling effects" exhibited by r and d in ( †). Unfortunately, neither Eells nor Sober (1994) nor Schlesinger (1995) considers how the measures l and r might cope with their alleged counter-examples.
Second, there seems to be little or no independent support offered for the crucial premise of this argument. The argument is persuasive only if it is granted that the intuitive degree to which E confirms H 1 is greater than the intuitive degree to which E confirms H 2 . The only reason that I have seen offered in support of this claim (e.g. Sober (1994) E) . But, this just seems to beg the question; it simply presupposes that the intuitive amount to which E confirms H is accurately gauged by the difference measure, and not by the ratio measure (or, by some other measure altogether). What we need here are independent reasons for believing precisely this!
Summary of Results
We have discussed three measure sensitive arguments which are aimed at showing that certain relevance measures are inadequate, and we have seen four mea-17 It has been argued by Schlesinger (1995) that parallel arguments can be run "backward" against d and in favor of r. Schlesinger (1995) describes a class of examples in which the difference measure seems to give the "unintuitive" answer (and, where the key probabilistic facts are analogous to ( †)). Schlesinger's examples drive home the point that the philosophical conclusions one draws from hypothetical, numerical examples of these kinds will depend crucially on what one takes the "intuitive" answers to be in the first place. See below.
sure sensitive arguments which presuppose the superiority of certain relevance measures over others. Table 1 summarizes the arguments which presuppose that certain relevance measures are superior to others, and Table 2 : Three arguments designed to show the inadequacy of certain measures.
18 As I explain in § 3.2, I do not think this argument is compelling, even when aimed against r. But, to be charitable, I will grant that it is, at least, valid when aimed against r.
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5 Conclusion: Where Do We Go From Here?
In the present paper, I have shown that many well-known arguments in quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are valid only if the difference measure d is to be preferred over other relevance measures (at least, in the confirmational contexts in question). I have also shown that there are compelling reasons to prefer d over the log-ratio measure r. Unfortunately, like Rosenkrantz (1981) , I have found no compelling reasons offered in the literature to prefer d over the log-likelihood ratio measure l (or Carnap's relevance measure r). As a result, philosophers like Gillies, Rosenkrantz, and Eells, whose arguments presuppose that d is preferable to both l and r, seem compelled to produce some justification for using d, rather than either l or r, to measure degree of confirmation.
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In general, there seem to be two viable strategies for coping with the problem of measure sensitivity. The first strategy is to simply avoid the problem entirely, by making sure that one's quantitative confirmation-theoretic arguments are robust (i.e. insensitive to choice of measure of confirmation).
20 On the other hand, if plausible robust arguments can not be found in some context, then one should feel compelled to give reasons why one's chosen relevance measure (or class of relevance measures) c * should be preferred over other relevance measures, the use of which would render one's argument invalid.
21
19 In Fitelson 1998b, I argue that this will be a difficult task, since there are some rather strong arguments in favor of l and against d. 20 This can be done in some contexts (e.g., in Fitelson 1998a, I outline a new, robust Bayesian resolution of the problem of evidential diversity, and Maher (1999) gives a new, measure insensitive Bayesian resolution of the Ravens Paradox, based on Carnapian inductive logic); but, I doubt that plausible, robust quantitative Bayesian accounts can always be found.
21 Ideally, it would be nice to see general, desideratum/explicatum arguments which rule out all but a relatively small class of ordinally equivalent measures of confirmation (i.e., arguments like those given by Carnap (1962, §67) , Good (1984) , Heckerman (1988), and Milne (1996) ). Such arguments would also have the virtue of contributing in a substantive way to the theoretical underpinning of quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. There exist probability models such that
Proof. For simplicity, I will assume that the background knowledge K consists only of tautologies. Then, by the definition of l, we have the following
There are lots of probability models of this kind in which l(H, E | K) is finite. Any one of these is sufficient to establish the desired result. ❑
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. There exist probability models in which all three of the following obtain:
Proof. Let K include the information that we are talking about a standard deck of cards with the usual probability structure. Let E be the proposition that some card C, drawn at random from the deck, is a black card (i.e., that C is either a ♣ or a ♠). Let H be the hypothesis that C is a ♠. And, let X be the proposition that C is a . Then, we have the following salient probabilities:
Hence, this probability model is such that all three of the following obtain:
Consequently, this probability model is sufficient to establish Theorem 2. ❑
C Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. There exist probability models in which all three of the following obtain: (i) β > δ and
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Proof. I will prove Theorem 3 by describing a class of probability spaces in which all four of the following obtain.
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E confirms both H 1 and H 2 (given K) ( * )
To this end, consider the class of probability spaces containing the three events E, H 1 , and H 2 (here, we take K to be tautologous, for simplicity) such that the eight basic (or, atomic) events in the space have the following probabilities:
Pr(H 1 &H 2 &Ē) = h = 417 800
Now, we verify that the class of probability spaces described above is such that ( * ), (i ), (ii ), and (iii ) all obtain. To see that ( * ) holds, note that we have both Pr(H 1 | E) > Pr(H 1 ), and Pr(H 2 | E) > Pr(H 2 ).
To see that (i ) holds, note that Pr(E) < Finally, we verify that (iii ) holds in our example (i.e. r(H 1 , E) < r(H 2 , E)). Proof. I will prove Theorem 4 by describing a class of probability spaces in which all three of the following obtain.
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Each of E 1 and E 2 confirms H (given K) ( * )
To this end, consider the class of probability spaces containing the three events E 1 , E 2 , and H (again, we take K to be tautologous, for simplicity) such that the eight basic (or, atomic) events in the space have the following probabilities:
Pr(E 1 &Ē 2 &H) = a = Pr(Ē 1 &Ē 2 &H) = h =
1000
Now, we verify that the class of probability spaces described above is such that ( * ), (i ), and (ii ) all obtain. To see that ( * ) and (i ) both hold, note that we have Pr ( This completes the proof of Theorem 4, as well as the Appendix. ❑
